Asger S›rensen, Copenhagen

Abstract, Deontology

The paper argues that in the distinction deontology-teleology, deontology is not an equal of teleology, and that this has been the case already from the very contruction of the term 'deontology'. It is assumed that this is of major importance for those who in their opposition to utilitarianism identify themselves with deontology, as does John Rawls. The claim is that deontology is constructed as a category within an understanding of ethics, which is basically teleological, i.e. within a utilitarian scheme of thought. That this is the case is shown by presenting the two original conceptions of 'deontology', Jeremy Bentham's and C.D. Broad's. Bentham has two conceptions of deontology, which both are tied closely to utilitarianism. Broad developed his distinction between deontology and teleology on the basis of a classification of another utilitarian, Henry Sidgewick. The matter is clarified by comparing Broad's conception of deontology with Weber's distinction between value-rationality..

Asger S›rensen

Deontology - born and kept in servitude by utilitarianism

Today the concept of deontology plays a crucial part in various analyses and debates in modern moral and political philosophy. From a relatively esoteric analytical term in prewar Anglo-Saxon ethics it was institutionalized through the distinction between teleology and deontology in the textbooks of William K. Frankena (1963; 1974). Deontological theories have since been seen as opposed to teleological theories, the standard example of the former being the ethics of Immanuel Kant (e.g. Frankena 1963, 25; Hallgarth 1998, 610), whereas the latter usually is exemplified by some kind of utilitarianism. In this sense deontology was given prominence in Anglo-American political philosophy by Rawls (1971), and accepted in the same sense in continental ethics by J�rgen Habermas (1983; 1991). In spite of this, however, hardly anybody has given it the close attention that such a prominent role should merit. 

There is a broad consensus in mainstream practical philosophy that the roots of the concept should be found in Broad's Five Types of Ethical Theory (F.T.; 1930). However, a brief survey of 'deontology' in non-anglophone philosophical encyclopedias and dictionaries (e.g. Ferrater Mora 1994, 816; Lalande 1991, 816; Canto-Sperber 1996, 401; Ritter 1972, 114) reveals a curious fact, namely that the one who constructed the neo-logism 'deontology, apparently was the same man, who invented utilitarianism, namely Bentham himself.

This, however, only becomes interresting when one actually reads the unfinished manuscript, which was published after Benthams death in 1834 with the title Deontology, and finds out that term not at all is intended to mean something opposed to utilitarianism; quite the contrary. Deonthology is a completion of utilitarianism as a generel worldview, stating for the first - and only - time the specifics of Bentham's utilitarianism as moral philosophy.

Originally then, deontology was conceived of as a part of utilitarianism; today they are seen as opposed. Is it just a curious fact, which shows the contingency of semantical meaning and the irony of history? Or can it give us a hint to something more substantial?

I will argue that this curiosity does indeed express something substantial, namely that of the two sides of the distinction, deontology is and has always been the dominated and relatively less important side. From the very beginning the meaning of deontology has been tied to that of utilitarianism, and this is still the case, although both the meaning of utilitarianism and deontology, and the relation between the two has changed. The structural pattern - the hierarchy and the power-relation - has remained, even though the content of the elements and the relation have changed. 

This fact becomes important, when the intention is to formulate alternatives to utilitarianism, which have been dominating Anglo-phone ethics for decades (Schneewind 1993, 155). Expressing an alternative in terms a positive identification with deontology - as done by e.g. John Rawls (1971, 26) - is to stay within the conceptual framework defined by utilitarianism. The implications of this point, however, I will not explore in this paper; in stead I will present the two original, but relatively unknown conceptions of deontology, Bentham's and Broad's.

Bentham

Skipping the detailed analysis, in sum Bentham has in Deontology at least two conceptions of deontology. The first takes deontology - as art and science, or art with science attached - as the most comprehensive category, divided into private deontology, which is private morality, and public deontology, which includes legislation and government in general. This conception is consistent both with his remarks that consider deontology as ethics at large, i.e. practical philosophy, and with the specification of deontology as a subcategory of a more comprehensive world-view. 

The second conception takes eudaimonics - as arts and sciences, or arts only - to be the most comprehensive category, and it comprises of deontology, restricted to private morality, and politics, legislation, government etc., all at the same footing. If deontology is ethics in this sense, then ethics is concerned exclusively with private morality. But since it is pre-defined as eudaimonic, i.e. as an activity aiming at one specific telos, namely happiness, deontology is a subcategory within a teleological framework, in casu utilitarianism. 

The first conception of deontology is apparently relatively neutral towards the utilitarian scheme of thought, but being only a formal conception, it must get its content from the worldview, it is part of. Consequently, when Bentham defines the content of deontology, it is utilitarian. The second conception of deontology adds to this point, showing that Bentham considers ethics as such to be inherently teleological, and that makes deontology part of this scheme of thought as well.

Broad

In the case of Broad, the matter deserve a little more attention. The distinction deontology-teleology is introduced without any reference to Bentham in Broad's analysis of the utilitarian, Henry Sidgewick's Method of Ethics (1874). It is thought of as a way of qualifying the use of 'ought' in judgements, distinguishing between deontological, teleological and logical applications of 'ought'. 

A deontological use of 'ought' in a judgement means that an action should be performed in a certain type of situation, "regardless of the goodness or badness of the probable consequences" (F.T., 162). Broads notes that many people would deny that they ever make such "unconditional" judgements, but they can probably be seen as making statements, which employ 'ought' teleologically, meaning "that everyone ought to aim at certain ends without any ulterior motive, e.g. his own greatest happiness, at the greatest happiness of all sentient being, and so on." Lastly, 'ought' can be applied logically, meaning that if someone consider a certain end ultimately, "then he ought to be consistent about it" (F.T., 162). 

Broad considers whether these three applications of 'ought' also involves three different meanings. He distinguishes between the narrow sense of 'ought' applied to actions "which an agent could do if he willed" (F.T., 161), and the wider sense, where this is not a condition. According to Broad, the wide sense is involved in the teleological application of 'ought' and the narrow in the logical. "For we believe it is within the powers of any sane human being to be consistent if he tries." However, "the logical ought is just a special case of the deontological ought" (F.T., 163), and this is important, because the narrow sense of ought is made acceptable to those, who do not acknowledge the deontological application of 'ought' in general.

Broad then ends up with the classical binary distinction between teleology and deontology. What is interesting, however, is that the logical, and thus deontological, use of ought is based on the idea of consistency in action and not in relation to judgements. Apparently Broad thinks that 'consistent' means that one ought to chose the appropiate means to realise an end, and avoid actions "inconsistent with its realization" (F.T., 163). With this concept of consistency, however, it seems strange to subsume the logical meaning of 'ought' under the deontological, since it is teleology, which by definition should be focussed on actions as means to an end, and not deontology.

To make point this more clear one can employ the famous distinction of the neo-kantian, Max Weber between end-rationality, often called instrumental rationality, and value-rationality. End-rationality is the kind of rationality, which is employed by economic theory and rational choice theory, where what matters is the right choice of means in view of the optimal realization of given ends (Weber 1921-22, 12). The rationality involved in value-rationality is rationality in another sense, i.e. the kind of rationality employed in logical reasoning, e.g. in the deduction from premisses to a valid conclusion. To Weber it is this latter kind of rationality, which can be attributed to the protestant "ethics of temper", which like deontology is defined by its disregard for consequences (Weber 1919, 551). Ethics of temper is rational and consistent in the strictly logical sense that its particular judgement can deduced from one or more general principles and that it therefore is non-contradictory. 

One would think that is was consistency and rationality in this latter sense, i.e. the rationality involved in making non-contradictory judgement, that was to be involved, if the logical sense of 'ought' was to be subsumed under deontology, specially since Broad actually does think of rationality in this way, when he interprets Kant (F.T., 128). But in the analysis of the utilitarian Sidgewick, Broad seems clearly to use the concept of end-rationality in his notion of consistency, although he (and Sidgewick, of course) in contrast to Weber is well aware that rationality in this sense, "hypothetical imperatives" (F.T., 152) can both be employed in an egoistic way and in a universal or utilitarian way. Broad's logical application of 'ought' has thereby nothing to do with logic in a more strict sense, and neither has deontology.

This distinction concerning the application and meaning of 'ought' Broads generalizes to divide ethical theory into two classes. Deontological theories contains propositions of the form "Such and such a kind of action would always be right (or wrong) in such and such circumstances, no matter what the consequences might be." Teleological theories judge the rightness or wrongness of an action by its "tendency to produce certain consequences which are intrinsically good or bad." (F.T., 206-07)

However, according to Broad, the real difference between teleology and deontology is that the former makes empirically based judgements about the relative non-moral goodness of all the consequences of an action, whereas the latter make a priori judgements about the connection between some kinds of actions and its immediate moral consequences (F.T., 214). Both makes judgement about consequences, but teleology just make more comprehensive, empirically based and - so it must be assumed - therefore better judgements. As Schneewind remarks, the idea that an "action can only be right because it produces good" is "deeply rooted" (Schneewind 1993, 150) in ethics.

Weber made it perfectly clear that from the perspective of calculating end-rationality, deductive value-rationality was not rational (Weber 1921-22, 13). Not so with Broad. His conception of ethics is not made explicit, but the result is the same: Like the ethics of temper deontology cannot be understood as rational in the full sense, but appears to be a dogmatic, deficient mode of teleology. This bias in the relationship between deontology and teleology, however, should not come as a surprise since the distinction is based on Sidgewick's tripartion of ethics. Broad states in the beginning of Five types that he has chosen "men of genius whose views differ from each other as much as possible" (F.T., 1), and the distinction between teleology and deontology only appears in the final analysis of Sidgewick, not in relation to the four preceding theories, those of Spinoza, Butler, Hume and Kant. 

Summing up 

Bentham is a deontologist in his own sense of the word. Kant too is a deontologist (F.T., 207), but only in Broadïs sense, i.e. within a utilitarian classification of ethical theories. 

Literature, Deontology, Asger S›rensen, Copenhagen

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