The Model of Divinity: Same-Sex Love in Plato's Lysis and Symposium Philip M. Fortier, M.A. Department of Philosophy Wayne State University September 1, 2002 Answer me this: As soon as one man loves another, which of the two becomes a friend - the lover of the loved or the loved of the lover? Or does it make no difference? - Plato, (Lysis, 212ab) This paper shall focus on the justification for the view that Plato's Lysis and Symposium, when understood together, constitute a unified theory of love (Cornford, 78). In particular, Lysis addresses the problem posed in the quote above: what does it mean to be a friend? While in Symposium, Plato offers us a look into eros (love), particularly as it relates to an idea of divinity. Thus, it is the purpose of this paper to argue that Plato intended to unite the experience of philos and eros in his idea of one's ascent to the forms and that he envisioned, a kind of pedagogical model offered in his Symposium: an elder lover brings to birth, the wisdom of the younger beloved, who returns the favor with sexual allowances (209b,c). This task is probably too ambitious given the complexity of these two dialogues and to some scholars; such a proposal may serve only to radicalize the understanding of classical pedagogy. But if we look to these dialogues, one cannot help but think, that a sort of wisdom lies therein. One hopes that Plato intended to inquire into these topics in an interest to gain some sort of truth, apart from the need to use some sophisticated rhetoric or to shape 'a young man's mind.' Thus, this paper will proceed as follows: 1) Some discussion will be presented dealing with contextual issues, namely Greek cultural practices and problems with language; 2) We will critically analyze textual support for the unity argument outlined above. 3) And lastly, this author will present some tentative reflections. What is love? What does it mean to be a friend? How does the love between friends differ, say in degree or kind, from the love shared by sexual partners? How should love or friendship be understood in contexts of unequal partners, say between teacher and student, parent and child, or younger and older friends? Nowadays, the topic of friendship is not a typical theme in our present cultural discourse. If we look to the ancients, Socrates and Plato figure prominently in our spectrum as two philosophers who examined the nature of friendship and love. Remarkably, it is Socrates, who in Lysis admits to his own very passionate desire to acquire friends, although he does not think he has reached this goal (Lysis, 211e). And in Symposium, generally believed to be a dialogue, which is more Platonic in character, Socrates also devotes considerable energy to the topic of love. In this paper, I shall argue that Plato intended to unite the experience of philos as expressed in Lysis with the experience of eros discussed in Symposium. Furthermore, it is my view that Plato proposed in these two dialogues, an alternative ascent to the forms, in which both philos and eros occur as natural elements within a kind of homosexual-pedagogical model. Before we address the textual support for my view proposed above, it is helpful to discuss briefly some of the language and cultural issues relevant to the dialogues. W.K.C. Guthrie, in A History of Greek Philosophy provides some valuable insights on the terms. For Guthrie, philos or philia is customarily translated as 'friendship' or 'friend'. In different instances, these terms may mean something akin to 'liking'. Either 'friend' or 'liking' seems irregular when referring to the mother-child relationship. A mother's feeling for a child typically surpasses friendliness. In such instances, translators may resort to eros, despite the fact that the word usually conveys sexual love (Watt, 119). Hence, the resulting confusion would lend support to Friedlander's argument that in some ways, the two terms are interchangeable thereby helping to make the case that Plato believed philos and eros were intimately connected (Guthrie, 143). Furthermore, says Guthrie, when friends become lovers - philos is used instead of eros. The term eros should be understood to include philos but not vice versa, confirmed today perhaps because couples often refer to a spouse as his/her best friend (Guthrie, 137). Thus, eros can mean everything from love toward the cosmos, to love toward a close friend to the passion between lovers. The renowned classicist scholar, K.J. Dover documents rather extensively, evidence of homosexual desires and emotions as culturally acceptable for the Greeks, especially in the leisured class. In the dialogues, Socrates' favoritism toward same-sex relationships is apparent. Scholars believe bisexuality was actually more prevalent. In any case, within homosexual contexts, a kind of older/younger power differential was typical. In Greek art, homosexual acts are depicted as an attraction between an older male, the lover (erastai), and the younger male, the beloved (eromenos). (Dover, B598). Dover claims that such desire was motivated by the older male's desire for the younger male's beauty, his athletic and masculine qualities not because he looked feminine. The objects of same-sex desire were young males, that is, males between the ages of puberty and "the growth of the first beard" (Dover, 87). Another possible contribution to a unity argument, involves the Platonic influence on later religious thinkers. It is beyond dispute that the Neo-Platonists and some Christian Church figures have been strongly attracted to Plato's thought, and in particular, his treatment of love in Symposium. Bonaventure reflects at length about the soul's ascent in his Journey of the Mind into God. He writes that the soul travels "as if to certain steps…and is disposed, to pass over to peace through ecstatic excesses of Christian wisdom…for he who does not enter through the gate, but ascends by another way, that one is a thief" (Bonaventure, 3). And the mystic, John of the Cross, in his famous work, The Dark Night of the Soul, provides a yet even more vivid account of love as ascent and union with God: "On a dark night, kindled in love…by the secret ladder…oh, night more lovely than the dawn, oh, night that joined beloved with lover" (Stanza, 1-8). But evidence in those writings is quite separate from the idea that Plato's texts, taken alone, reveal anything that would genuinely sustain the religious conclusions by these mystics. At best, scholars say, Plato has offered a mystical vision, albeit not one labeled as "Christian" per se – for obvious reasons. And to some, such a reading is aided by a prima facie reading of Symposium and Lysis, because in those two dialogues, we find the text loaded with religious imagery. The analysis of Plato's theory of love in the secondary literature is extensive. Unfortunately, however, commentary on Lysis specifically, is somewhat scant and preference in the secondary literature is given to either Symposium or Phaedrus or both. The arguments proposed by Pohlenz, Wilamowitz and Cornford represent a few of the traditionalists view on the relation between Lysis and Symposium. Pohlenz holds to the view that philos and eros are inseparable (Bolotin, 201). Wilamowitz and Cornford concur. Given stylometric evidence, they argue that philos in Lysis represents an early attempt by Plato to work out a real doctrine of eros, which is later articulated more completely in Symposium (Guthrie, 143). On the other hand, in his commentary on Lysis, Hans von Arnim argues, that a feeling of affection (philein) between virtuous men, is so unique and special that it cannot result from any deficiency, of character or otherwise. For von Arnim, the kind of idealized friendship portrayed in Lysis should not be connected to the kinds of sexual desires suggested as natural needs elsewhere in dialogues (Bolotin, 211-212). Phaedrus offers the clearest refutation of von Arnim's claims. In this dialogue, we are confronted with real textual support for the notion that Socrates argues for a kind of 'homosexual-pedagogical model' in which a friendship (philos) between the younger beloved and the older lover is the highest kind of eros and thus, is the truest and ideal kind of relationship. In Phaedrus, we read: Thus, the loved one receives all manners of service, as peer of the gods, from a lover that…loves in all sincerity…he is kindly disposed to him who pays such service. In time past he has been misled, by schoolfellows…that told him that it is shameful to have commerce with a lover, and by reason of this he may repel his advances. Nevertheless, as time goes on ripening age and ordinance of destiny…lead him to welcome the other…for assuredly fate does not suffer one evil man to be friend to another, nor yet one good man to lack the friendship of another (255a-e). This passage is the clearest example that Socrates envisions the lover/beloved kinship at a level with the gods, and resulting from maturity and "the ordinance of destiny," it is a preferred kind of love. But now let us return to the arguments posed by Socrates and the issues of language in Lysis, the first dialogue of concern. The dialogue's setting appears to be a real-life scenario. There are five main characters: Socrates, Hippothales and Lysis, which are classmates and good friends (or lovers) and two other older youths, Ctesippus and Menexenus. Like other early works, Socrates is seeking to obtain a single definition for things. The apparent topic in Lysis is the subject of friendship. At an early point, Hippothales' love for Lysis is made known. Some of the youths tell of teasing Hippothales for his rather vocal infatuation with Lysis (205b-c). At 204b-c, Socrates claims to know how Hippothales should treat Lysis – a remarkable testimony since Socrates rarely claims to know anything. Socrates now claims to know something about love or at least, "to detect at a glance both a lover and a beloved"(204c). He suggests that Hippothales teach his young lover "by humbling him and drawing in his sails instead of puffing him up and spoiling him"(210e). In 211e-212a, we get a bit of information about Socrates own deepest held desires. Of all things, Socrates desires the most to acquire friends. After a comment about the profound friendship between Lysis and Menexenus, Socrates raises the key inquiry, "As soon as one man loves another, which of the two becomes a friend – the lover or the loved or the loved of the lover? Or does it make no difference?"(212a). Socrates adds, that sometimes between friends, one party may develop either indifference or even outright distaste of the other in a friendship. Socrates asks, how can this be? (212c). If love is not mutual, one cannot be a lover. If this is so, one cannot truly love much else – horses, wisdom, and the like (212d). And so, as is typical, Socrates turns the inquiry on its head. At 213e, Socrates confesses to the difficulty of the inquiry. He decides to appeal to the poets for resolution: "For poets, I conceive, are as good as fathers and guides to us in matters of wisdom"(214a). Quoting Homer, Socrates offers the notion that friendship may be just a matter that is caused by God – because God draws the like to like. After all, whatever knows - must be like what it known. A lover must be like what is loved. In any event, Lysis ends with no satisfactory answer and a final definition of friendship is not presented. Cornford, among others, assert that Lysis provides evidence that Plato had not yet developed a mature theory of love like the one he offers later the Symposium (Cornford, 71). If Cornford is right that one dialogue is a trial run for the other then the two emotions, philos and eros must run together or at least relate in some important fashion. Given the dates of the two dialogues, it is logical to conclude that thought development could be a factor. Although Lysis does not specifically mention the forms, some of the language does hint at them: namely that the handling of philos implies a familiarity with the forms (219e). The unity argument is not complete without an analysis of eros in Plato's Symposium. Commentaries on the role of eros in Symposium are voluminous and the dialogue's artistic and poetic merit is undeniable. Eros (Love) is depicted as the grandest of all the gods. Speaking of Love's magic, Phaedrus proclaims: "Love is the oldest and the most glorious of the gods, the greatest giver of all goodness and happiness to men, alike to the living and to the dead" (Symposium, 180b). The Symposium, which means 'drinking party' consists of a series of speeches on various ideas related to love. After the meal, drinking would start. The dialogue begins with a report by Appollodorus on a dinner party held under the auspices of Agathon (172a). At one point, Eryximachus proposes a topic to replace the binge drinking usually associated with this event: that each of the members at the dinner offer a speech about love (177d). As in Lysis, Socrates confirms his agreement to this proposal saying that love is one topic, if any, about which he has some authority to speak on (Dover, 164). The most significant speech in the dialogue is Socrates' report on what he has learned about love from Diotima (201d-212c). At the outset, Diotima introduces three analogies to convey the 'in-between sense': between that which is beautiful and ugly, between that which is knowledge and ignorance and most importantly, between the immanent and transcendent realms. Herein, says Plato, Love exists as a middle way, between that which is mortal and immortal. (202d). In 202e, Diotima equates this sense of Love as "a very powerful spirit, [which] is halfway between god and man." Other passages provide further details on the attributes of eros, namely its utility, procreative and productive qualities. The practical value of eros, by analogy, is presented as a longing for beauty and its possession forever (204de, 205d, 206a). Diotima adds, "love is to bring forth upon the beautiful, both in body and in soul"(206b). The Greek translation of this phrase is: tokos en kalos. The term kalos means "beauty" as in "the beauty of soul and tokos, refers to "birth" (Guthrie, 177). Together the phrase means, "birth in beauty"(Cobb, 74). The procreative aspect of Beauty, and by analogy also Love, is mentioned by Diotima to refer to time "when the procreant is big with child"(206d). But the connection is more clearly stated in 206e: "A longing not for beautiful itself, but for the conception and generation that the beautiful effects". Scholars mark such a comment as key because Plato moves from the idea of desire as naturally possessive, to an idea of procreation, understood here more broadly than merely sex to beget children, since in this text, it applies to both heterosexual and homosexual contexts (Cobb, 75). At 209bc, Diotima further expands the definition of procreation. She suggests a view that associates 'procreation' with the pedagogical model. In this model, the elder male lover brings to birth, the wisdom of the younger beloved, who returns the favor with sexual allowances (Symposium, 209b,c). Dover claims that the Western view of the pedagogical endeavor is derived from this original model of the lover-beloved model as practiced in the Athenian aristocracy. A passage in Phaedrus confirms Dover's point: "the soul who has sought after wisdom unfeignedly or has conjoined his passion for a loved one with that seeking" has a chance "to regain her wings" and "return to a place whence she came"(Phaedrus, 249a). Regaining one's wings is identified with admission to the world of the divine (Dover, 164-165). In Symposium, Diotima ends her treatment of love with a discussion of the ascent to beauty itself. Many scholars have described this as "the ladder of love"(Bloom, 55). Diotima's presents a remarkable expression of unity in Plato's metaphysics. Is Plato's view of love, presented in Lysis and Symposium, unified in some fashion? Is the sheer fact of when they were written, enough to sustain the argument that their date of composition means their themes should be understood in terms of a progressive thought development? And finally, does Plato mean to actually say that many kinds of love, including those expressed in the context of highly sexualized, could ever be construed as vehicles to a kind of divine love? In Symposium, Plato treated beauty, in either the male or female case, as a particular instance, which, if moderated correctly, stimulated an ascent to an understanding of the forms. It is clear that for Plato, the human response to what is good and beautiful is that we cannot help but to desire and love it. It would seem that the desire for good and beauty is just a given as the natural response in the human condition, even though the overwhelming portrayal of eros in these dialogues is expressed within, what many people believe to be a special context, a homosexual relationship (Symposium, 204e-205b; 207a- 209a). In Lysis, we see textual evidence for the claim that there exists an intrinsic relationship between desiring the good, and says Socrates – such a desire is natural to all men – and the love one has for his friend. As has been mentioned briefly, Phaedrus also provides explicit textual support for the idea that philos (friendship) between the younger beloved and the older lover is the highest kind of eros and moreover, this is an ideal kind of relationship. In Symposium too, we find many instances where eros is used broadly to refer to the love of many things. And finally, the Symposium dramatically presents an account of the relationship between one's appreciations of sexual experiences, and presumably the pleasure in them, as the starting point for an ascent to the divine. As a result, to know the forms, and thus possess divine knowledge, Plato offers us an important model, in effect, to bridge the apparent divide between philos and eros. Works Cited Bloom, Alan. Plato's Symposium. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2001 Bolotin, David. Plato's Dialogue on Friendship. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1979. Bonaventure, Bagnoregio. The Journey of the Mind into God. (Itinerarium Mentis in Deum). Franciscans Archives. Grand Rapids, MI: Calvin College, 2001. Cobb, William. Plato's Erotic Dialogues. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993. Cornford, F.M. The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1967. Dover, K.J. Greek Homosexuality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989. Guthrie, W.K.C. A History of Philosophy. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1975. John of the Cross. The Dark Night of the Soul. Translated and edited by E. Allison Peers. Franciscans Archives. Grand Rapids, MI: Calvin College, 2001 Plato. Collected Dialogues. Edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. Plato. Symposium. Translated and Edited by: Robin Waterfield. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1994. . Watt, Donald. Early Socratic Dialogues: Lysis, Charmides. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1987. For a more detailed account of Friedlander's argument, see Guthrie's A History of Greek Philosophy. Dover writes that "Plato's early dialogues are set in the gymnasia [an area where males typically exercise nude] Socrates' youthful friends are commonly…in love with boys, and he fully accepts these relationships: Ktesippos and Kleinias in Euthydemos, Hippothales and Lysis in Lysis, the allusion to Meno 70b" (Dover, 154). It is known that Socrates loves and pursues Alcibiades (Protagoras, 309a). The prevalence of exclusive homosexuality in the dialogues is unknown. However, many scholars characterize the coupling of Pausanias and Agathon in Symposium as a life-long relationship (Dover, 13). The precise nature of this so-called 'power differential' must wait for another paper. In Liddell-Scott's Greek-English Dictionary, the word ephebos means "a youth about to enter full citizenship, especially one undergoing military training." In actuality, the Greeks practiced a kind of ephebophilia: a love for the adolescent not a true pedophilia as many assume. Pohlenz offers a compelling argument that philos in Lysis, eros in Symposium and desire in Phaedrus differ only in degree but not in kind and are each components of a unified theory of love (Bolotin, 202) Of course, his argument assumes that sexual desire arises from deficient conditions and such a claim needs further justification. According to Guthrie, Lysis belongs to a group of Plato's early dialogues, which include Euthyphro, Laches and Charmides. Given these works, the terms, setting and characters indicate, says Guthrie, that Lysis probably falls as toward the later among those early dialogues. Ctesippus and Menexenus also appear with Socrates at his death scene in Phaedo (Phaedo, 59b). This is a remarkable comment since in many other passages; Socrates spends a good deal of time criticizing the poets, but now he appeals to them for wisdom. Guthrie calculates its date as 385 B. C. indicated by the defeat of the Arcadians (Guthrie, 365). The setting is at the house of Agathon the night after he won his first victory as a playwright. A meal is served but, according to historians, drinking is the main purpose, apart from the speeches. Aristodemus is identified as one of the lovers of Socrates and they both share the habit of walking around barefoot (172b). Appollodorus was not present but received the story of the party from Aristodemus who attended the party with Socrates (172b). For brevity sake, the speeches of Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon and Alcibiades will not be outlined. Socrates identifies Diotima as a Mantinean woman and adds that she is "deeply versed in this [love] and many other fields" (201d). Scholars generally agree that Diotima speaks as the voice of Socrates. Diotima asserts: "This is the way, the only way; he must approach, or be led toward, the sanctuary of Love. Starting from individual beauties, the quest…for beauty must find him ever mounting the heavenly ladder, stepping from rung to rung – that is, from one to two, and from two to every lovely body, from bodily beauty to the beauty of institutions, from institutions to learning, and from learning…to the special lore that pertains to nothing but the beautiful itself –until at last, he comes to know what beauty is" (211c).